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The Myths About Entrepreneurial Employees
Stefan Kiihl
University of Munich. Department of Sociology
Businesses' internal control over market mechanisms is propagated using
concepts of the "one-man-enterprise", the "intrapreneur" and the "self-
Ltd.". At the same time, individual employees are understood to be
autonomous entities within the company. This article deals with the myths
in management literature about intrapreneurs. It is shown that the contra-
dictory environmental demands within a company are only dealt with by
sharing the work out amongst different departments to a limited extent,
and are more commonly passed on as paradoxical behavioural demands
on the so-called "intrapreneurs".
1 Introduction
In neo-liberal theory, markets are seen as a particularly rational form of re-
ciprocal relationship. While terms such as "hierarchy", "bureaucracy" or
"control" have overtones of inefficiency and arbitrariness, markets are
considered a particularly fair and effective form of distribution of goods. It
is implied that corporate division of labour can be particularly well organ-
ised in self regulated markets and that central authorities such as the state
should keep out of market processes as much as possible.
For some years the market has been increasingly popularised as a cen-
tral instrument for the internal organisation of companies. I With the use of
key words such as "organisation networks", "marketisation", "market con-
trolled decentralisation", "internalisation of the market" and "strategic de-
centralisation", the competition between businesses of varying sizes has
been depicted as an instrument for the internal coordination of businesses.
I The discussion about internal markets dates back to the early 20th century. The
principal first won recognition in general management discussion through con-
cepts such as Lean Management and Business Process Reengineering.
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The management thereby simulates a form of capital market in the rela-
tionship between the top of the company and decentralised entities and
promotes the formation of intragroup work, management, resource and
product markets.
While in the beginning the principles of "marketisation" almost exclu-
sively referred to the relationship between company headquarters and or-
ganisational subunits such as plants, profit centres or partly autonomous
groups, marketisation has since then been increasingly propagated as a
model for the relationship between businesses and their employees and for
that between workers. Using concepts such as "intrapreneur", "one-man-
enterprise" or "self-Ltd.", the members of a business are depicted as no
longer seeing themselves as company employees- as organisation men or
corporate men- but rather as quasi "enterprisers within the enterprise".'
With these concepts it is proclaimed in management literature that en-
trepreneurship is required from every employee. After all, according to this
logic, it is the company's aim to undertake something rather than leaving it
undone. For far too long "controllers, royal vassals and nitpickers" have
concerned themselves with ensuring that employees only do what is al-
lowed according to their job description. It is about time, according to the
management rhetoric, to condemn the "feudal economy" within businesses
and to make sure that employees no longer work beneath "aristocratic"
bosses, but rather operate as autonomous enterprisers within the enter-
prise.'
Given the prevalent euphoric- sounding management literature about
"intrapreneurs", "one-man-enterprises" or "self-Ltds." it would be a natu-
ral reaction to dismiss the propagation of the "enterpriser within the enter-
prise" as the latest colourful management balloon and to declare these "en-
terprisers" to be merely fashionably dressed employees (and thereby
2 The fundamental issue is older. Even Schumpeter (1926, p.lll) took the concept
of the enterpriser from the unity of capital property and function of leadership. In
his opinion managers could also act in an entrepreneurial way as "employees" of
an incorporated company.
3 Up until now there has been hardly any scientific thought into how concepts of
the "one-man-enterprise", the "entrepreneur" or the "self-Ltd." could affect the
functioning of companies: Sociological, ergonomic or business management stud-
ies take either profit centres or partly autonomous groups of larger decentralised
entities into consideration or else predominantly quantitatively arranged studies
about subjective changes in work demands are carried out, which are however
solely restricted to the functionality of organisations.
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explain the lack of research into the concept of the intrapreneur). In con-
trast to profit centres, which have in the meantime been employed as an in-
ternal structuring principle in many businesses, there have been few exam-
ples until now (and also in scientific thought) of companies for which the
"intrapreneur", "one-man-enterprise" or "self-Ltd." shapes their appear-
ance. This gradually indicates how a "conglomerate of internal enter-
prises" can function and to what extent it differs from a "company with
employees".
Regardless of the still low diffusion rate of the concept, the vision of the
intrapreneur as a model is in the meantime influencing a succession of re-
organisation projects, the consequences of which can already be observed
in the businesses. The concept of empowerment is orientating itself in
much the same way as the concept of target agreement on the model of
"intrapreneurshi p".
Below, I take the concepts of intrapreneurs, one-man-enterprises and
self-Ltds. to their word in order to bring out structural problem areas which
can develop as a result of selective introduction of entrepreneurs into the
company. Three myths of management literature, "adoption of intrapre-
neurship at all levels", "intrapreneurship makes employees the new lead-
ers" and "integration of employees into the business through intrapreneur-
ship" serve alongside as a starting point for my sociological line of
argument.
2 Myth: Intrapreneurship will be introduced at all levels of
the organisation at the same time
The perception in management literature is that marketisation will be im-
plemented at all levels of a business- at that of profit centres, groups and
teams as well as that of individual employees. This is the case, for exam-
ple, in one of the leading management books, in which the concept of the
"enterpriser within the enterprise" is propagated so that the "entrepreneu-
rial understanding, thinking and behaviour of all employees" is questioned
(Warnecke 1992, p.226). The head of IBM, Lou Gerstner, naturally takes
as a starting point the fact that his colleagues enjoy winning- "as individu-
als and as a team" (quoted in Schmidt 2000, p.38).
The scientific analogy which is used for this acceptance of market-
moderated principles at all levels of organisation is that of the self-
organised fractal. The idea of the fractal- orientated management doctrine
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is that decentralised entities should adapt themselves to the ever-changing
general framework through self-organisation. In this process of self-
organisation, according to this presumption, profit centres, groups and
teams as well as individual employees become similar in the way they
function. Every fractal, and consequently every position in the firm, should
function in the same way as the whole business. This results in the most
widespread efficiency and independently solved task possible. The coordi-
nation between the individual fractals takes place through market-
moderated organised service relationships.
2.1 Not everybody can be an enterpriser - contradictions in
the concept of "enterprisers within the enterprise"
In management literature, the conception of the "intrapreneur", "one-man-
enterprise" or "self-Ltd." is construed as a "win-win situation". This takes
as a starting point the fact that all members of an organisation can profit
from the implementation of "entrepreneurship in the enterprise", as long as
they willingly stick to the principles of entrepreneurship.
This, however, overlooks the fact that the various "intrapreneurs", "one-
man-enterprises" and "self-Ltds." within an organisation are, as a rule, so
interwoven with one another that they curtail one another's freedoms. The
freedom of one, according to an old view of social science, is the insecu-
rity of the other.' Even one of the founders of business management, Erich
Gutenberg, asserted that the gain of freedom, and consequently entrepre-
neurship, can only be bought by the relinquishment of freedoms in other
areas of the organisation (cp. Gutenberg 1983, p. 273).
The fact that ideas about intrapreneurs do not gain acceptance amongst
all employees of a company without problems becomes particularly evi-
dent when people involved at different levels of the organisation are con-
cerned. Degrees of freedom on the one level in no way determine equal in-
dependence on the other: Self-control on one level can on the contrary
mean external control on the other. These ideas are developed below by
4 Luhmann, for example, takes up an old argument of Parsons'. Parsons objected
to attempts to democratise all institutions and to leave to the individual all deci-
sions pertaining to them, arguing that this would only work if the individual peo-
ple involved had no relationship with one another. The moment that assumptions
of social interdependence between individuals are acted on, individuals can no
longer make decisions which concern them because the freedom of one becomes
the insecurity of the other.
The Boundaries of "Marketisation" 235
means of the interplay between three levels in decentralised enterprises-
the profit centre, groups and individual employees.
Firstly, the interplay between profit centres and employees: the ap-
pointment to head of the profit centre is tied to an increase in power when
compared to a classic intermediary management role. While a head of de-
partment in production must always coordinate with colleagues from de-
partments for quality assurance, purchasing or construction, the head of a
profit centre has, as a rule, all the important functions incorporated in his
domain. Only by taking on the overall responsibility for quality, stocks,
appointments, employees, costs and throughput time can he be made re-
sponsible for the market success and the resultant win or loss.
This development from "small enterpriser" to management level of the
profit centre does not necessarily lead, however, to his colleagues also be-
coming "intrapreneurs". The opposite is in fact partly the case. Just return-
ing to the concept of intrapreneurs, authoritarian management structures
can develop in profit centres. The profit centres can become small prince-
doms with very harsh managers. It is precisely the pressure on profit centre
managers from company headquarters which can lead to them feeling
compelled to directly interfere in the work of their colleagues and to limit
their autonomy.
Secondly, the interplay between profit centres and teams: in the litera-
ture, a distinction is made between a strategic market- orientated decen-
tralisation and an operative decentralisation put into practice in a work
process. The interrelation between operative and strategic decentralisation
is not so uncomplicated as is commonly suggested. The management of a
profit centre is passed on to a manager who will act as an enterpriser
within the enterprise.
Included in this entrepreneurship is his ability to make decisions about
the internal structure of the profit centre. If the company holding decides
that employees should be motivated to greater, more entrepreneurial think-
ing by the introduction of partly autonomous groups, this can be perceived
by the profit centre manager as a restriction of his autonomy. He may
make reference to the fact that he can only be an entrepreneur when he si-
multaneously stipulates how his profit centre is organised. This can lead to
the manager deploying and cancelling teams almost at random and justify-
ing this action with reference to his entrepreneurial autonomy.
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Thirdly, the interplay between groups and employees: in the group work
literature it has long been taken as a starting point that the options open to
individual employees are broadened through group and team work. Group
work particularly is understood as a consequent continuation of job expan-
sion. But even in the early eighties it was critically noted that partly
autonomous groups would not necessarily mean freedom of authority for
their members. It was argued that the autonomy of a group of people can-
not be equated with that of an individual because the group members can
repress one another.
Many empirical studies have since shown that the pressure on individual
employees within partly autonomous groups compared with classic taylor-
istic labour organisation commonly increases rather than decreases (see an
overview in Frohlich/Pekruhl 1996, p. 112 et seq.). A dynamic frequently
develops in groups which does not lead to self-development and social
recognition for its members. On the contrary, group work is commonly felt
to be a "source of power-exertion and aggression, contempt and discrimi-
nation". The pressure is therefore perceived by the group members as even
stronger because deviation from the group norm can be harshly sanctioned.
While managers must as a rule keep to the company's official catalogue of
sanctions (caution, withdrawal of salary, dismissal), groups can impose
their sanctions on deviant group members much more extensively. The
sanctioned group member has very little opportunity to complain to the
manager because the power relationships within groups are very diffuse
and attracting attention from outside the group to conflicts within it is of-
ten negatively sanctioned as an uncooperative deviance from the unwritten
rules of the group.'
2.2 Internal conflicts and informal processes of attenuation
What happens nowadays when a business uses concepts of the "one-man-
enterprise" to try and establish autonomy in individual employees on all
levels? I have observed the formation of new conflict areas for which,
5 The American sociologists Smith and Berg (1987) speak in light of this tendency
about the "paradox of regression in groups". Every process of group formation re-
quires each individual member to restrict their identity and individuality to only a
few parts. Groups do not gain their strength through their members contributing as
whole people but on the contrary through the retraction of particular areas of indi-
viduality on the part of each group member. The process becomes a paradox be-
cause groups can only allow their members freedoms when they have beforehand
limited their individuality in order to successfully produce a shared group effect.
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however painstakingly, attenuation mechanisms must be found within the
organisation.
In the enterprises of the welfare state in the second half of the twentieth
century, relationships appeared to be unambiguous. As soon as I was re-
cruited by a company and began to work there I became "one of the fam-
ily": I worked for "Chrysler" or for "Microsoft". With all internal career
struggles and conflicts in everyday working life, employees could refer to
a stable friend-foe image. The businesses which operated in the same mar-
ket were seen as the competition. Internally, competition was eliminated
and a shared company identity was maintained: "us vs. the rest of the
world".
In businesses which try to control internal processes of market and
competition mechanisms using the concept of the "intrapreneur", this
clearly defined friend-foe image becomes blurred. It has already been gen-
erally asserted in the most recent studies of decentralised organisations that
a social-Darwinist climate has developed in these organisations. The main
social-Darwinist feature is illustrated, as a rule, by conflicts at the same
level of the organisation: business divisions and profit centres compete for
tight resources. Different departments of the same company find them-
selves in competition with one another. The internal competition is to an
extent stronger that the competition with business rivals. On the employee
level the "doers", "day managers" and "what does the world cost- types"
compete with one another and the climate amongst colleagues becomes
tougher.
This competition between entities at the same level is added to by the
competition between different levels through the introduction of "intrapre-
neurs" on all levels of the organisation. The profit centre manager is not
only in competition with other profit centre managers but also with his col-
leagues, who try to establish themselves as "enterprisers within the enter-
prise". The group enters into competition with employees who try to estab-
lish themselves as "intrapreneurs".
In decentralised businesses this does not generally lead, however, to an
outright fight of "everybody against everybody else". This relates less to
management endeavours towards (re)integration of employees (keyword:
business culture, corporate identity), but rather to the informally develop-
ing mechanisms for regulation of conflict. It can be observed that the con-
cept of the "intrapreneur" undermines the perception of partly autonomous
group work which has become popular in management in the last few
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years. A decision against collaborative work in permanently fixed groups
is made more unconsciously than consciously because of the orientation
towards "demanding entrepreneurship from every employee". Permanently
changing teams are more likely to catch on than fixed groups with c1ear-
cut tasks and members due to the propagation of the concept of the "intra-
preneur".
The realisation of entrepreneurial behaviour at all levels of the company
appears to be an illusion. Even when the intrapreneur is propagated as a
central structural feature of the company, informal and often unconscious
processes develop with which the company employees defuse the threat of
competition. The demand for entrepreneurial behaviour at all levels of the
organisation can be maintained in management discourse but is replaced in
everyday working life by a more realistic form of labour organisation less
likely to cause conflict.
3 Myth: employees become the new leaders in busines-
ses through the implementation of entrepreneurship
At first glance it may seem paradoxical to market theorists for managers to
call for the internal market- it would eventually lead to the abolition of
their profession. Following the logic of a liberal market theory, central
leadership is no longer needed by the market. The hierarchies would erode.
The many small "enterprisers within the enterprise" would become the
"new leaders" in the enterprise and would oust the bureaucratically organ-
ised managers.
But evidently the impulsive and frivolous act of public suicide on the
part of managers is not taking place. Despite all enthusiasm for internal
markets, managers are obviously not vanishing off the face of the earth.
Instead, a complex suspension of power relationships appears to be taking
place amongst those involved through the strengthening of market princi-
ples. .
3.1 The fiction of the pure market - the meaning of the social
embedding of markets
Neo-c1assical market theory and economic theory take as a starting point
the fact that various contractors offer their goods and services on a market
and that those both interested and financially capable compare the quality
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and price of the services and goods on offer with one another. The coordi-
nation takes place in the markets exclusively on the basis of price, from
which all relevant information about quality, deadlines and delivery capa-
bilities is calculated. This leads to a contract between the buyer and seller
in which service and consideration are thoroughly specified (cp. the dis-
cussion in Baker 1990, p.591).
This ideal typical market seems fair because cooperative relationships
for longer periods are not catered for in market transactions. In the market
transaction, the vendor is only interested in the buyer's ability (or inability)
to pay, and not in his political leaning, gender, nationality or religion.
From this perspective, markets appear to be quasi- democratic models with
the motto "one euro equals one vote" which distances itself from consid-
eration of "social standing and class", "morals and religion" or "family and
friendships" .
In this line of thinking, dynamic sampling of the organisation through
principles of marketisation and competition can be considered. It is argued
that in these companies the capability, motivation and creativity of em-
ployees is no longer inhibited by managers who came into their position
years previously and now belong to an "old boys" network in which they
help one another further up the ladder. Instead, a climate now predomi-
nates in which everybody, irrespective of their gender, origin or skin col-
our, can assert themselves on the internal market by way of their own
achievements.
In practice, however, markets have very little in common with this ideal
type. Even the grand seigneur of French sociology, Emile Durkheim, de-
veloped the idea that only the "non-contractual part of the contract", such
as trust and social relationships, enable anything like a free market to de-
velop. From this perspective, markets are not "natural phenomena" which
occur when social development is left well alone, but are rather the result
of social construction (see Friedberg 1993, p.9).6
6From the perspective of society as a whole, Polanyi (1994) developed the idea
that the implementation of market principles is always conducted by organised
regulatory measures. From this perspective, markets do not develop through lib-
eration of the economy from state control, but on the contrary are made possible
because of the state as a central authority. Generally accepted formalities such as
property rights, freedom of contract and legal security repress free market devel-
opment and thereby make markets at all possible.
240 Stefan KGhl
Several empirical studies have since demonstrated the way in which
market transactions are embedded in a multitude of social processes. It has
been shown that even for supposed prototypes of markets, such as national
securities markets, stock markets or agricultural auction markets, the social
relationship between traders strongly influences the transaction. The exis-
tence of money as a means of exchange has itself neither made direct
negotiations redundant nor depoliticised the exchange (cp. Moullet 1983;
Baker 1990).
In light of the social embedding of markets, scholars speak of a "fiction"
or "social myth" of the pure market and demand that markets be observed
in their actual form (White/ Eccles 1986, p.l35; Friedberg 1993, p.l28).
The question therefore begs to be asked how internal markets in which the
"intrapreneurs", "one-man-enterprises" and "self-Ltds." operate are struc-
tured.
3.2 The meaning of objectives, membership and hierarchies in
organisations and the important differences between internal
and external markets
Directly because markets are socially embedded, it is necessary to bring
out the differences between external and internal markets. The boundaries
of a company mean that internal market relationships can be organised
very differently to the market relationships between the business and its
suppliers, clients or partner firms. The assumption that markets are socially
constructed is to be understood as a demand for greater differentiation
rather than obliteration of the boundaries between the organisation and its
surrounding environment. Using three features- objectives, membership
and hierarchies- it can be shown that whether a market exists in a social
subsidiary system of the economy or in an organisation is a central differ-
ence.
On objectives: in contrast to the societies of both antiquity and the mid-
dle ages, modem societies do not commit themselves to high-ranking ob-
jectives such as the happiness of the people, racial purity or the fulfilment
of God's will.' Accordingly markets, as an important method of coordina-
tion within the economy, are not subordinate to a superior objective. Com-
plaints about the "terror of the economy" refer to the fact that markets de-
7 Societies which nowadays do commit themselves to such an objective risk being
discriminated against as totalitarian, ideological and outdated.
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velop a life of their own and elude every form of superior "humanitarian"
objectives. In contrast to markets: irrespective of whether in an administra-
tive department, a high-tech company or a trade union, objectives such as a
more or less amicable gratification of enquiries into identity cards, the
penetration of a new ultra-light mobile phone onto the market or the con-
clusion of a trade agreement with large pay increases playa central role in
the orientation of organisations.
From this central distinction between organisations and objectives, it is
clear that internal markets are much more firmly orientated towards objec-
tives than external markets. Business divisions, profit centres or depart-
ments in internal markets cannot assume that being in the black is a guar-
antee for continuance in the company and therefore in the internal market.
Outstanding performance on the part of an intrapreneur or a one-man-
enterprise is just as small a guarantee of their continuance within the cor-
porate group. Urged by strategic advisors to do so, companies constantly
change their core competences and redefine their objectives. When a par-
ticipant in the internal market is at the current time no longer well suited to
the negotiated objectives, he is excluded from the internal market proc-
esses, quite irrespective of how he is performing. The motto within a com-
pany is not simply "do what you want but be profitable with it" but "do
what you want but be profitable with it and stick to the (ever-changing) ob-
jectives of the corporation."
But the reverse process is also to be seen. A profit centre can continue to
exist within a business, even when it has only been making losses over the
past few years. While a company with such a deficit would quickly go
bankrupt in the "free market economy", it can continue to exist within the
internal market because it is financed by profitable profit centres within the
system. The background to this development is that the enterpriser does
not only work with the aim of being profitable. Motives such as personal
fulfilment and Christian missionary work can also playa role.
On membership: A total exclusion from society only takes place in ex-
c)ptional cases. Most modem states to not revoke deviant citizens' nation-
ality. As the most radical form of exclusion, the death penalty is only used
in very few "civilised states". Even the "free" market refrains from global
exclusion of buyers and sellers. A machinist would have difficulty in justi-
fying himself if he did not sell his machines to the highest bidder. A buyer
of telephone systems does not exclude vendors from the market process
simply as a matter of principle. Everybody can participate in external mar-
kets, provided they offer appropriate payment.
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In contrast to markets, the management of membership is a central fea-
ture of organisations. Who belongs to an organisation and who does not is
selectively determined (Luhmann 1995, p.l6) and this has implications for
internal markets. Even though it is suggested in management literature that
the "enterpriser within the enterprise" makes his own decisions about what
is marketable, decisions about continuance or discontinuance are made
within the organisation. A profit centre does not go bankrupt but is always
either closed or sold. An intrapreneur similarly does not go bankrupt but is
dismissed in the usual manner.
This difference between "inside" and "outside" makes it possible not for
market processes to invade unfiltered into various units but on the contrary
to work in companies with simulated markets. Internal markets are struc-
tured in such a way that the achievements of a profit centre or intrapreneur
can be compared to market prices on "free" markets, but as a rule the
members of a business are granted the opportunity to accept the lowest
price of external vendors. The settlement prices between individual enter-
prisers within the business are not negotiated by a free-for-all contest of
abilities but are determined by company headquarters.
On hierarchies: the age in which society was organised by a strict hier-
archy is long since gone. There is no longer any king, emperor or pope
who, through his chain of command, can govern various spheres of the
lives of the people. Nobody would accept George Bush or Romano Prodi
as a hieratically superior leader, the only exception being the members of
the White House or the officers working for the European Union. In con-
trast to modem societies, hierarchies are a central feature of organisations.
Despite all the rhetoric about decentralisation and abolition of hierarchy,
organisations are unimaginable without hierarchy. It is because of this hi-
erarchy that unions, administrative departments and enterprises can act at
all like computable, collective entities because through direction, assur-
ances from management level of the organisation can be fulfilled
(Luhmann 1997, p.834).
Internal markets are not at odds with hierarchical coordination in the en-
terprise, but on the contrary are included in the hierarchical structures. It is
hierarchical decisions which decisively structure internal market mecha-
nisms. The recruitment of employees, their assignment to positions, their
dismissal or promotion and their salaries form the basis of organisational
criteria which are decisively determined by the hieratical head of the com-
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pany. They are not in some way dictated by anonymous market mecha-
nisms (Scott 1986, p.255).
It cannot be inferred from the distinction between internal and external
markets by means of objectives, membership and hierarchies that a great
bureaucratic conspiracy on the part of companies' top management lies
behind the marketisation of internal processes. It is often overlooked that
decisions about objectives, membership and hierarchies are not centralised
at the head of the company. A company's objectives can change without
any strategic decisions from top management. An employee can resign
from a company when an offer from another firm is more appealing. Even
hierarchies themselves can erode without any interference from manage-
ment level. But one thing is clear- employees do not become the new lead-
ers of the business as a result of the conception of "intrapreneurs", "one-
man-enterprises" or "self-Ltds.".
4 Myth: the concept of intrapreneurship promotes the in-
tegration of employees into the business
It is complained about in management literature that employees were never
formerly perceived as important "human capital" and as people were kept
out of organisation as much as possible. Employees were not allocated a
central role in company rhetoric until the seventies and eighties. "People
are the most important resource in the company" (Deal/ Campbell 1982,
p.15). "Excellent companies consider their employees as a source of qual-
ity and productivity enhancement" (Peters/ Waterman 1983, p.37).8
Only through the use of management concepts such as "intrapreneurs",
"one-man-enterprises" or "self-Ltds." is it possible to integrate employees
and their creativity, productivity and engagement into a company. Em-
ployees would have more job satisfaction because of extended freedoms
and would therefore identify more strongly with the company.
These notions of the integration of employees by means of the intrapre-
neurship concept is at first surprising because one would sooner expect a
gaining of independence within the company followed by a willing inte-
8Withouthavingto questionthe claimto originalityofDeal/CampbellandPeters/
Waterman,the ideas can be traced far back. The basic idea can be found in Karl
Marx,who stipulatedthat the capitalistcanonlymakea profitby exploitingexter-
nal workers.
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gration in an organised context. An enterpriser is no longer an "organiza-
tion man" (Whyte 1958) or "corporate" (Kanter 1983) but is a trader in his
own affairs. How is it, then, with the integration of the intrapreneur?
4.1 The dilemma of simultaneous integration and exclusion of
employees
The idea has in the past been developed, in the example of the classic bu-
reaucratic organisation, that companies' management faces the dilemma of
integrating their employees into the firm whilst at the same time keeping
the option of excluding them open. Within enterprise there is a contradic-
tory demand of both integrating employees, so that their creativity and en-
gagement can be utilised, and also maintaining the fact that they are re-
placeable, in order not to become dependent on them.
It is argued in system theory that, in contrast to families, organisations
are based on the principle of exchangeability of people. Organisations are
comprised of members who are only partly integrated. In modem society,
one does not become an employee of a company to the exclusion of all
else. This only partial integration of employees on the one hand relieves
the burden on individual employees because a dismissal from a company
does not simultaneously mean an exclusion from other organisations such
as sports clubs or even society as a whole." On the other hand however,
this also relieves the burden on organisations because they must no longer
feel responsible for their employees as people. The unscrupulousness with
which employees are fired is only possible because heads of personnel can
be certain that a dismissal does not generally mean an exclusion from soci-
ety as a whole.
How integration can be organised in enterprises without the destinies of
the company and the employee becoming intertwined is the result of eve-
ryday processes of negotiation. On the one hand, organisations are con-
structed in such a way that managers can be replaced as well as employees
without the organisation falling apart as a result. These expectations of
employees' conduct are determined through hierarchical positions of rank
and by programmes. They specify who should talk with whom and how.
However, at the same time company processes are not programmed in
such a way that an organisation can operate like a machine. The organisa-
9 It is because of this that mass unemployment is so problematic because an exclu-
sion from an organisation is increasingly felt to be an exclusion from society and
therefore the pressure on both employees and companies increases.
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tion is dependent on the willingness and capability of its individual em-
ployees to deal with everyday fluctuation of the company's objectives
(Luhmann 1995).10
There is no eternal compromise for the relationship between employees'
inclusion and exclusion. It is always negotiated afresh. How has this been
solved traditionally? How does this relationship alter when an enterprise
tries to make its employees "enterprisers within the enterprise" using the
concepts of the "intrapreneur", "one-man-enterprise" or "self-Ltd."?
4.2 The paradox of an "enterpriser within the enterprise": the
enhancement of employment contracts with elements of con-
tracts for work and labour
The contradiction of inclusion and exclusion of employees was classically
connected to the employment contract. Although employers like to com-
plain about what they are letting themselves in for in regard to obligations,
worries and problems, it cannot be overlooked that enterprises, administra-
tive departments and unions attain a high level of flexibility through em-
ployment contracts. While service and return service are specified exactly
in a sales contract, such as in the purchase of a stamp or training package,
with an employment contract the employer purchases labour in a very ab-
stract form. By signing a contract of employment, the employee is effec-
tively writing out a blank cheque and declares himself prepared to utilise
his own manpower, capability and creativity for the purpose of the tasks
presented to him. He does not have written into his contract in which areas
his performance will lie (cp. Commons 1924, p.184).
10Cornelius Castoriadis (1997, p.137 et seq.) described the same process from a
Marxist perspective. He argues that there is a fundamental contradiction in capital-
ism in the fact that employees are simultaneously treated as objects of bureaucratic
manipulation and also as self-acting subjects. Management is instructed to exclude
employees from production processes in order to maintain the manageability of
such processes but at the same time is also instructed to keep employees involved
in the process because the necessary flexibility of the production process can only
be guaranteed using knowledge acquired in situ. Castoriadis alludes to this contra-
diction, that processes of creation of value can never run as trivial machines can,
but rather always require flexible adjustment from employees who possess the
production "know-how". This "know-how" also forces employees to guarantee the
functioning of the system by going against the system's own rules to do so, i.e. to
deviate from the official rule book in order to ultimately guarantee production.
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The deal between employer and employee is structured in such a way
that the employee submits to the company objectives, promises to obey hi-
erarchical instructions and is rewarded by the employer with payment,
share options and/ or career prospects (cp. Barnard 1938, p.167 et seqq.).
A "zone of indifference" is generated, along with its many consequences,
inside of which employees may not refuse to follow the orders, demands,
instructions and guidelines of their superiors (Simon 1957).
The advantage to company management is clear: employees promise a
form of general obedience to orders and instructions specified no further.
They therefore enable management to adapt the organisation to altered
demands very quickly and without complicated internal processes of nego-
tiation. If every member were allowed the right to permanently offer his
opinion to discussion of the structure of the organisation, the formation of
flexible, complex structures would never take place (Luhmann 1995).11
The company management pays for this advantage of flexibility, how-
ever, with a control and integration problem: because the employment con-
tract does not specify the exact nature of the employee's achievements, the
employee could try to limit his performance. Unlike a contract for work
and labour, in which performance is specified exactly and in which it is in
the contractor's interest to produce results as quickly as possible, it is im-
plied that employees try to conserve their labour. Management reacts to
this threatening withdrawal of labour through control. From this perspec-
tive, the whole history of enterprises in modem industrial society can be
interpreted as a struggle for control of this labour."
When companies now experiment with the concept of the "intrapre-
neur", the "one-man-enterprise" or the "self-Ltd.", something significant
has occurred in the relationship between inclusion and exclusion. The re-
placement of employees with independent enterprisers or the substitution
of employment contracts with a variety of contracts of work and labour are
clearly not taking place in enterprise. "Independent sub-enterprisers",
"quasi-autonomous workers" and "franchisees" are increasing as a general
model but organisations do not appear to be solely dependent on this
II A whole branchof organisationtheory is based solelyon the idea that the effi-
ciencyof a companycan be directlyput downto the use of the employmentcon-
tract to enableactionwithouttime-consumingprocessesof communication(cp. as
a startingpointCoase 1937).
12And this can also be said of a theoreticallydemandingand empiricallyinterest-
ing schoolof thought in industrialsociology-the LabourProcessDebate.
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model. A development based only on independent sub-enterprisers would
be a waste of the organisation's potential for flexibility and efficiency: the
advantages of flexibility attained by the organisations through employment
contracts would be lost. Performance would have to be specified exactly in
every completed contract and it would be very expensive for every opera-
tion to be financially appraised and compared with offers from other con-
tractors (Coase 1937).
In contrast to "real enterprisers" - and this is an important distinction-
"enterprisers within the enterprise" do not become the proprietors of the
means of production relevant to their creation of value. The unity of "hav-
ing" (the means of production) and "doing" (the yielding of results), as is
the classic case with the self-employed, does not exist for the "intrapre-
neurs", "one-man-enterprises" and "self-Ltds.". The formulation of the
"enterprisers within the enterprise" therefore seems paradoxical.
In the case of the "intrapreneurs", "one-man-enterprisers" and "self-
Ltds.", the employment contract is enhanced with elements of the contract
of work and labour." A central instrument with which the employment
contract can be combined with elements of the contract of work and labour
is target agreement. Through the use of this mechanism, market pressure
can be produced within the organisation in two ways: firstly, employees
are connected to the market conditions of the company with demands such
as "10% profit margin" or "5 % more new clients" (negotiated). Secondly,
target agreements can establish internal competition.
4.3 The internalisation of the exclusion and inclusion dilemma
Everything indicates that the dilemma of exclusion and inclusion is not be-
ing resolved in the new work structure but is merely being relocated. To
both exaggerate and simplify: in the classic tayloristically organised firm,
the sides of the conflict between inclusion and exclusion were clear. On
the one side was the management, who tried to make as much use as pos-
sible of the abstract manpower of employees, already purchased in a lump
sum, without becoming involved in a one-sided relationship of depend-
ence. On the other side were the employees, with an interest in conserving
their own manpower but at the same time wanting to be as indispensable to
13 This model has existedpreviously-considerfor examplesales representatives.
The differenceis that an attempt is now being made to apply it throughoutthe
wholeorganisation.
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the company as possible in order to move their own market value up the
ladder.
To again exaggerate, the concepts of intrapreneurs, one-man-enterprises
and self-Ltds. tend to shift this conflict to the individual employees.
Oswald Neuberger (2000: 73) argues, following Michel Foucault's line of
thought, that control no longer comes from one omnipresent boss but that
the market is elevated to a single boss from whom nothing escapes and
who objectively rewards success and harshly punishes mistakes. The im-
pression develops amongst employees that failures as intrapreneurs are
punished not by their superiors but by the alleged "objective conse-
quences" of their own actions. Dismissals and closures of departments are
no longer perceived as the arbitrariness of an enterpriser geared towards
maximising profits but as the logical consequence of the internal market.
With the introduction of entrepreneurship into the company, every em-
ployee is now himself confronted with the problem of inclusion and exclu-
sion. Klaus Peters described the process in such a way that the two wants,
which in the bureaucratic, system were neatly allocated to two different
people- here the employee who really just wants to go home, and there the
boss who wants to detain him against his will- now simultaneously coin-
cide in the same person due to the concepts of intrapreneurship. On the one
hand the intrapreneur does not want to work any longer than he has to but
on the other hand wants to return to his desk (Peters 1999, p.8).
Questions which were in the past classically posed by top management
suddenly emerge as questions of the intrapreneur: is my contribution part
of the company's core competence_or should I develop my capabilities dif-
ferently? Is my contribution enough for the company or must I offer more?
Does my labour really have a current market value or am I merely a bur-
den for the firm?
5 Conclusion: paradoxical behavioural demands in mar-
ketised companies
It would be all too easy to describe the concepts of the "intrapreneur",
"one-man-enterprise" or "self-Ltd." as merely the latest publicity gimmick
with which to guide employees. Certainly, these management concepts are
not implemented into the company on a one-to-one basis. They suggest a
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conclusiveness which in practice is not to be found." With the concepts of
the "intrapreneur", "one-man-enterprise" or "self-Ltd.", a development, al-
ready foretold in the decentralisation craze of the nineties, is being radical-
ised: the contradictory environmental demands which face a company are
only intercepted by organisational structures to a limited extent, and are
more commonly passed on as behavioural demands for employees to deal
with instead.
5.1 From the unambiguousness to the inconsistency of behav-
ioural demands
The sociologist James D. Thompson (1967) pointed out that for a long
time a central strategy for companies, administrative departments and un-
ions has been to seal off a company's core for creation of value from un-
certainties or contradictory demands. Through the development of special
departments to deal with uncertainties such as operations scheduling, per-
sonnel and organisation, or buying and selling, the assembly line of a car
manufacturer, the warehouse and shipping department of a wholesale
company or the processing department of an administration are greatly se-
cluded from the uncertainty of the environment and are provided with
largely unvarying information.
The division between departments dealing with uncertainties on the one
side and a largely stable core for creation of value on the other would in
many cases lead to monotonous and tedious working conditions for em-
ployees working at the conveyor belt or in the shipping or processing de-
partments. There would also, however, be advantages for these employees.
They could expect their job instructions to be formulated in such a way as
to be achievable. Wilfred GliBmann rightly called attention to the fact that
the exercising of power must involve instructions or orders which are in
principle accomplishable. According to GliBmann, severity and cruelty
cannot be ruled out and the fulfilment of an instruction or order can result
in severe injuries. In the most extreme case imaginable, a command is only
accomplishable if the employee who carries it out loses his life. But the
following is also true: orders must be accomplishable. Unrealisable com-
mands would damage the legitimacy of the person giving out the orders
and the system of command as a whole. If the person giving out orders ut-
14 Approaches centred around employees do not therefore differ fundamentally
from other management concepts which are similarly not to be found in their pure
form.
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ters an unrealisable command he will no longer be taken seriously by his
colleagues (GliBmann 2000:9).
With the concepts of "intrapreneurship", "one-man-enterprises" or "self-
Ltds.", this "protection" is removed. The functioning of secure roles, to
which Luhmann draws attention, tends to be retracted. Employees no
longer know what to expect, what they may do and what they may not.
There is no longer any protection from the mood swings of those with
power within the organisation, nor any relief from limitless responsibility.
5.2 Paradoxical behavioural demands
Employees understand this reorganisation as paradoxical behavioural de-
mands. On the one hand, intrapreneurs are required to compete with other
intrapreneurs. On the other however, they should be able to cooperate with
other employees. Motto: everyone is pulling in the same direction but only
the best prevail. On the one hand, intrapreneurs are required to go their
own way, but on the other should not lose sight of the common objectives
of the company. Motto: everybody seeks their own way but we all sit in
one boat. On the one hand, enterprisers within the enterprise should violate
rules and regulations, but on the other should respect the structures set out
by the company. Motto: do what you want but do not violate the written
and unwritten rules.
Because of these paradoxical behavioural demands, employees find
themselves in a classic double-bind situation, i.e. they are confronted with
contradictory behavioural demands, both of which must be simultaneously
carried out. When only one of the behavioural demands is carried out, the
other is being disobeyed. When the employee switches here and there be-
tween the behavioural demands, he runs the risk of being accused of unre-
liability and of having no clear policy.
Oswald Neuberger (1991: 46) pointed out that a possible way of avoid-
ing these paradoxical behavioural demands is to begin a meta communica-
tion of them. Employees should internalise the paradoxes of "dependent
autonomous workers" and "entrepreneurial behaviour in the enterprise"
not as their own problems but as a contradiction inherent in the construc-
tion of this new form of organisation. The consequent demythologisation
of the concepts of the intrapreneur, one-man-enterprise and self-Ltd. is
merely the first step towards this. To adapt an assertion of Rainer Werner
Fassbinder (and ultimately of Karl Marx): when one cannot immediately
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change something due to its paradoxical character, one should at least de-
scribe this paradoxical character (see also Ktihl2002).
Translated by Alice Ashworth
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